The aims of this paper are twofold. First, I offer a new insight into Shepherd’s theory of mind by demonstrating that she distinguishes a threefold ‘Variety of Intellect’, that is, three kinds of minds grouped according to their cognitive limitations. Following Shepherd, I call them (i) minds afflicted with idiocy, (ii) inferior understandings, and (iii) sound understandings. Second, I show how Shepherd’s distinction informs her theory of education. While Shepherd claims that her views serve to improve educational practices, she does (...) not explain how her threefold ‘Variety of intellect’ does so. I argue that Shepherd’s distinction contributes to her aim by providing pedagogues with a more comprehensive grasp of the various cognitive limitations of the people in their care. This allows the former to adjust their expectations and to provide need-oriented guidance. (shrink)

Constitutive instrumentalism is the view that responsibility practices arise from and are justified by our being prosocial creatures who need responsibility practices to secure specific kinds of social goods. In particular, responsibility practices shape agency in ways that disposes adherence to norms that enable goods of shared cooperative life. The mechanics of everyday responsibility practices operate, in part, via costly signaling about the suitability of agents for coordination and cooperation under conditions of shared cooperative life. So, there are a range (...) of identifiable conditions where the ordinary operation of responsibility practices—and thus, the usual normative force of the practices—is disrupted. Even so, these conditions are not so widespread as to favor a more thoroughgoing abandonment of responsibility practices. (shrink)

The Bayesian brain hypothesis, predictive processing, and variational free energy minimisation are typically used to describe perceptual processes based on accurate generative models of the world. However, generative models need not be veridical representations of the environment. We suggest that they can be used to describe sensorimotor relationships relevant for behaviour rather than precise accounts of the world.

In this article I propose a resolution to the history issue for responsible agency, given a moderate revisionist approach to responsibility. Roughly, moderate revisionism is the view that a plausible and normatively adequate theory of responsibility will require principled departures from commonsense thinking. The history issue is whether morally responsible agency – that is, whether an agent is an apt target of our responsibility-characteristic practices and attitudes – is an essentially historical notion. Some have maintained that responsible agents must have (...) particular sorts of histories, others have argued that no such history is required. Resolution of this contentious issue is connected to a wide range of concerns, including the significance and culpability of different forms of manipulation, the plausibility of important incompatibilist criticisms of compatibilism, and of course, a satisfactory account of moral responsibility. As it turns out, history matters sometimes, but less frequently than we might think. (shrink)

The way digital information technologies work and, more specifically, the possibilities for action that technological devices offer to us affect our processes of political belief formation. In particular, there seems to be a close connection between our digital affordances and the increase of the sort of polarization that threatens the proper functioning of democracy. In this paper, we analyze whether the type of polarization linked to the use of digital technologies, and which endangers the health of public deliberation, has to (...) do with the adoption of beliefs whose contents are increasingly extreme—extremism—or, on the contrary, has more to do with increasing our credence in the core beliefs of our political identity—radicalism. (shrink)

The income gap between women and men expands with age, culminating in a gender pension gap in old age that is much larger than pay gaps earlier in life. In this article, I question two attempts to justify gender pension gaps. One insists that lower financial contribution justifies women's lower overall pensions. The second states that women must receive less monthly because they live longer. I argue that neither of these reasons is fair in a gender‐unjust world. Rather than justifying (...) pension gaps, female longevity is an opportunity to promote gender justice: by subsidizing longer lives, old‐age redistribution attenuates lifetime gender inequality. In the case of retirement pensions, the use of age to promote gender equality may be preferable to explicit gender differentiation. There is, then, a feminist case for old‐age redistribution. (shrink)

The Luck Problem has existed in one form or another since David Hume, at least. It is perhaps as old as Stoic objections to the Epicurean swerve. Although the general issue admits of different formulations with subtly different emphases, the characterization of it that will serve as my target focuses on “cross-worlds” luck, a kind of luck that arises when the decision-making of agents is indeterministic.

Explicitly fictional armchair reconstructions of the past are sometimes taken to be informative about philosophical issues. What appeal a counterfactual genealogy has depends on its speculative accuracy, that is, its accuracy in identifying relevant causal, functional, or explanatory particulars. However, even when speculatively accurate, counterfactual genealogies rarely secure more than proofs of possibility. For more ambitious deployments of genealogy – for example, efforts to show what properties the target concept in fact predicates – genealogies are hamstrung by the possibility of (...) predicative drift, or changes over time in what the concept predicates. Still, even when counterfactual genealogies fail to tell us about our current practices or concepts, they may identify appealing successors. Pettit's (2018 Pettit, Philip. 2018. The Birth of Ethics: Reconstructing the Role and Nature of Morality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.[Crossref], [Google Scholar]) innovative defense of moral realism and his employment of a counterfactual genealogy provides an illuminating instance of the promise and challenges facing accounts employing counterfactual genealogies. (shrink)

I discuss experimental work by Nichols, and Nichols and Knobe, with respect to the philosophical problems of free will and moral responsibility. I mention some methodological concerns about the work, but focus principally on the philosophical implications of the work. The experimental results seem to show that in particular, concrete cases we are more willing to attribute responsibility than in cases described abstractly or in general terms. I argue that their results suggest a deep problem for traditional accounts of compatibilism, (...) and that they may cast some light on the literature surrounding Frankfurt cases. I also suggest a way in which mature philosophical convictions about free will may reflect a contingent process of refining and defending either of two competing strands of intuitions, and suggest that this may partly explain the persistence of philosophical debates about free will. (shrink)

Both legal and moral theorists have offered broadly “communicative” theories of criminal and moral responsibility. According to such accounts, we can understand the nature of responsibility by appealing to the idea that responsibility practices are in some fundamental sense expressive, discursive, or communicative. In this essay, I consider a variety of issues in connections with this family of views, including its relationship to free will, the theory of exemptions, and potential alternatives to the communicative model. Focusing on Michael McKenna’s Conversation (...) and Responsibility, I argue that communicative accounts, and the conversational model in particular, direct our attention to important and under-appreciated elements of our responsibility practices. However, rather than focusing on a model of conversation-as-address, as McKenna does, we do better to regard gossip as the paradigmatic conversational form that captures the main features of moral responsibility. (shrink)

I examine the extent to which Dennett’s account in Freedom Evolves might be construed as revisionist about free will or should instead be understood as a more traditional kind of compatibilism. I also consider Dennett’s views about philosophical work on free agency and its relationship to scientific inquiry, and I argue that extant philosophical work is more relevant to scientific inquiry than Dennett’s remarks may suggest.

Although commitment is one of the attributes of family firms of continuing interest to researchers, they almost always study it from the perspective of the owning family. In the current work, we analyze the commitment of the non-family employees. We propose a model of commitment, with the aim of studying the implications that this variable may have for family businesses. We study both the aspects on the basis of the approaches of Meyer and Allen's three-component model of organizational commitment and (...) stewardship theory. Results show that the identification level of non-family employees positively and significantly influences the profitability and the survival or continuity of familyowned businesses. At the same time that their involvement level positively and significantly influences the survival or continuity of family-owned businesses. (shrink)

Una de las estrategias legislativas más extendidas en el ámbito penal es la de establecer límites mínimos y límites máximos para cada delito. De esta manera, al momento de determinar la pena para el caso en concreto, los jueces utilizan estos límites como guías de menor o mayor reproche por la conducta cometida. Entre los elementos en los que se apoyan los jueces para esta determinación se encuentran la culpabilidad del agente al momento de cometer el hecho y la lesividad (...) de su conducta delictiva. Sin embargo, existen ciertos casos en los cuales la pena mínima se muestra desproporcionada con el reproche que merece el agente. En particular, en este trabajo abordaré estas situaciones a fin de reconstruir algunas discusiones existentes en la filosofía jurídica y política. (shrink)

Political egalitarians tend to defend equal distributions of voting power at specific times, as in ‘one election, one vote’. Appealing as it is, the principle seems incompatible with distributing power proportionally to the stakes voters have at different elections, as in ‘one stake, one vote’. This article argues that the tension above stems from the temporal scope ascribed to political equality, as at specific moments of democratic decision-making instead of over entire lives. More specifically, ascribing a lifetime view to political (...) equality renders equality compatible with proportionality at different elections. I first show that storable votes differ from standard votes in their distinctive commitment to lifetime political equality. I then argue that storable voting schemes are compatible with three key reasons to value political equality: equal consideration of interests, relational equality, and non-domination. Finally, storable votes are also consistent with proportionality at specific times. I conclude that the neglected idea of lifetime political equality can, through storable votes, deliver proportionality without inequality. (shrink)

According to a common belief concerning the Mach-Boltzmann debate on atoms, the new experiments performed in microphysics at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries confirmed Boltzmann’s atomic hypothesis and disproved Mach’s anti-atomic view. This paper intends to show that this belief is partially unjustified. Mach’s view on atoms consists in fact of different kinds of arguments. While the new experiments in microphysics refute indeed his scientific arguments against the atomic hypothesis, his epistemological arguments are unaffected. In this regard, (...) Mach’s epistemological approach remains relevant for today’s discussion on the status of the notion of atom. (shrink)

Desde mediados de 1974 mi familia, padres y hermanos de origen argentino, estábamos ya instalados en la Ciudad de México. Para entonces había decidido estudiar filosofía, y por diversas circunstancias, ingresé en una universidad jesuita, la UIA, donde concluí los estudios de licenciatura y maestría. En ese periodo concentré mi atención en la filosofía clásica y medieval, y en áreas teóricas como la epistemología y la metafísica. Había iniciado, también en la UIA, la licenciatura en Derecho...

Psychotherapy is a well-established, efficacious, and fully accepted treatment for mental disorders and psychological problems. Psychotherapy is an interpersonal practice engaging patient values, interests, and personal meanings at every step. Thereby, psychotherapy abounds with moral issues. In psychotherapy ethics, numerous moral issues converge, including self-determination or autonomy, decision-making capacity and freedom of choice, coercion and constraint, medical paternalism, boundaries between health and illness, insight into illness and the need for therapy, dignity, under- and overtreatment, and much more. The Oxford Handbook (...) of Psychotherapy Ethics covers the whole range of ethical issues in the heterogenous field of psychotherapy, closing a commonly perceived gap between ethical sensitivity, technical language, and knowledge among psychotherapists. The primary audience is psychotherapists in clinical practice. Furthermore, the Oxford Handbook of Psychotherapy Ethics addresses the whole range of professionals providing mental health services beyond psychology and medicine including counselors, social workers, nurses, or ministers. The Oxford Handbook of Psychotherapy Ethics is not only intended for a clinical audience but also for a philosophical/ethical audience. The goal of the is to explicitly link the two disciplines by fostering a productive dialogue between them, enriching both the psychotherapeutic encounter and the ethical analysis and sensitivity within and outside the clinic. (shrink)

Talking about ‘suffering’ in relation to ‘old age’ implies reflecting on its semantic fields, its various references and the relationship between the two in a dynamic way. We therefore propose to reflect first of all, in a philosophical way, on ‘suffering’ and its specificity in relation to other terms such as ‘pain’; then we will look at the meaning of ‘old age’ and its semantic field: ‘old age’, ‘third age’, ‘senectitude’; we will continue with the question of the relationship between (...) suffering and elderly people to detect if there is a determination and connection between both realities; to, finally, propose, in continuity with our conclusions, a practical look from the human activity in a humanistic paradigm of Occupational Therapy. (shrink)

Este artículo apunta a describir los significados que un grupo de universitarios ha construido sobre la experiencia de enseñar español a migrantes haitianos. La metodología corresponde a un estudio de caso cualitativo. El caso es un proyecto de responsabilidad social universitaria gestionado por académicos de la Universidad de Santiago de Chile, quienes forman, orientan y acompañan a un grupo de universitarios en su labor como monitores. La muestra estuvo conformada por 9 estudiantes, con un año de experiencia en el proyecto, (...) distribuidos en dos grupos de conversación. El análisis fue de carácter inductivo. Los resultados indican que los monitores experimentaron un proceso de ajuste de expectativas en torno a la enseñanza de una lengua, las situaciones emergentes, el grado de autonomía, la interacción didáctica, los aprendices y sus propias habilidades como docentes, entre otros. Se concluye que el modelo de intervención basado en el aprender haciendo y el aprendizaje cooperativo es válido para la formación de especialistas en enseñanza de ELE, aunque se requiere repensar el proceso de acompañamiento en aula por parte de los académicos encargados del proyecto. (shrink)

After the criticism that Martin Heide-gger made of Western metaphysics some authors like Gilson or Fabro, among others, wanted to enter into confrontation giving them the oppor-tunity to study in depth most important theses of authors like Thomas Aquinas and his esse philo-sophy. Gilson’s theses had an important impact on the world of Thomism, but Lawrence Dewan, also a Thomist, wanted to defend against Gilson the traditional interpretation of Cayetano and Capreolo, which until now had been regarded as the most (...) celebrated commentators of Thomas. This article investigates a specific point of this confrontation: the causation of esse. El legado de Martin Heidegger con su crítica a la metafísica occidental ha suscitado numerosos estudios en torno a la perenne cuestión acerca del ser, la metafísica y el fundamento mismo de la filosofía. Étienne Gilson, entre otros autores, fue un medievalista que tomó el pulso al pensador alemán para demostrar que Tomás de Aquino no esencializó el ser, como aquél pretendía. Sin embargo, junto con el Francés, en torno a la filosofía del ser tomista surgieron otros estudiosos que quisieron confrontar el tomismo gilsoniano con lo que entendían era un modo más adecuado de entender el verdadero tomismo. Uno de los puntos más interesantes sobre esta confrontación es, sin duda, el papel del esse tomista en la comprensión de la causalidad, entrando aquí en juego, a posteriori, interesantes cuestión en torno a la relación entre el pensamiento tomista y el aristotélico. (shrink)

Pocas personas habr n suscitado tan un nimemente la imagen del maestro como don Manuel Pedroso. Nadie que lo haya conocido ha dejado de mencionar ese ejemplar del magisterio que rebasaba ampliamente el mbito meramente universitario. Los pr logos a este libro, obra de disc pulos o amigos, dan fe, de la huella profunda que dej en ellos. Pero nos informan tambi n de la renuencia de Pedroso a rematar sus abundantes notas y esbozos y a publicar sus resultados. (...) Por eso es tan importante la labor realizada con estas p ginas, ordenadas por sus disc pulos y reimpresas ahora en esta colecci n dedicada a rescatar la labor in dita o desconocida en Espa a del exilio espa ol de 1939. (shrink)

Este libro cuenta la historia de pensamiento filosófico y científico español e hispanoamericano desarrollado a lo largo del recién pasado siglo XX. Su propósito es ser un companion, una guía o compañero, que introduzca y oriente en esta materia de una manera eficaz, atractiva e interesante. La primera de sus cuatro partes se ocupa de la llamada Edad de Plata de la cultura española, que comienza en los últimos años del siglo XIX y termina con el estallido de la Guerra (...) Civil. La segunda abarca el cuarto de siglo comprendido entre el principio de la Guerra Civil y la década de los sesenta, el periodo que corresponde a la dictadura franquista y en el que resulta obligado contemplar separadamente el pensamiento de la España residente en el territorio nacional y en el exilio. La tercera parte se ocupa del estudio de los últimos cuarenta años del siglo XX, cuyas dos primeras décadas, fueron revolucionarias y rupturitas. La cuarta y última parte contiene una historia sintética del pensamiento hispanoamericano del siglo XX, escrita por filósofos hispanoamericanos interesados en comprender la historia intelectual de sus respectivos países. Hemos querido de esta forma renovar la memoria y profundizar en el recuerdo de que buena parte de los herederos culturales de la Edad de Plata española fueron exiliados en esos países para devenir ciudadanos suyos. (shrink)

El formalismo no es la única dolencia que aqueja al Derecho o, mejor, a quienes tienen la función de interpretarlo y aplicarlo. Pero es quizás la más perniciosa en los países latinos por el carácter de enfermedad endémica que ha adquirido en nuestra cultura jurídica. Es cierto, por otro lado, que no todo lo que se llama a veces "formalismo" es igualmente rechazable; e incluso hay un formalismo -un significado de esa expresión- que no lo es en absoluto. El Derecho (...) es, en buena medida, un fenómeno de autoridad; en el mismo, las razones formales tienen una importancia fundamental, lo que no ocurre, por ejemplo, en la moral. Por eso, los jueces no deben dialogar, como a veces se dice, de tú a tú con la Constitución y con las leyes, sino que deben reconocer la autoridad de la una y de las otras; en el caso del juez constitucional, el sometimiento a la Constitución debe ir unido a la deferencia hacia el legislador como principio interpretativo fundamental. Si las cosas no fueran así, no habría Estado de Derecho, simplemente porque el imperio de la ley habría pasado a ser imperio o gobierno de los jueces. (shrink)

Proponents of the philosophy of liberation generally counsel that various forms of liberation in at least the Americas requires that we should fight Eurocentrism and resist the ontology and conceptual framework of Europe. However, most of the work done in this tradition relies heavily on the terminology and theoretical apparatus of various strands of European philosophy. The apparent disconnect between the aims and methods (or if you like, the theory and practice) has given rise to a criticism I call The (...) Eurocentrism Problem. I argue that the Eurocentrism Problem has not received an adequate reply, and that it reflects a number of underlying flaws in the philosophical program of the philosophy of liberation. These problems can largely be avoided if we significantly recast the philosophy of liberation, eliminating its reliance on the conceptual foundations provided by Levinas, Heidegger, and so on. (shrink)

Focusing on the recent work of Michael Bratman as emblematic of several important developments in the philosophy of action, I raise four questions that engage with a set of interlocking concerns about systemic functionalism in the philosophy of action. These questions are: (i) Are individual and institutional intentions the same kind of thing? (ii) Can the risk of proliferation of systemic functional explanations be managed? (iii) Is there an appealing basis for the apparent methodological individualism in our theories of action (...) and agency? and (iv) Why not, instead, pursue a methodologically anti-individualist and ecological approach to action and agency? The latter alternative, I suggest, offers a promising way to retain many of the core insights of the Bratmanian project while avoiding the difficulties inherent to some of the methodological presumptions of some strands of contemporary philosophy of action. (shrink)

This article examines the Kantian thesis of the a priori nature of our knowledge of space. Because it makes the representation of objects possible as external to us and all others, and consequently, as distinct and individualized, space (whatever its structure may be) claims the status as necessary condition and as apriori possibility of all knowledge. However, in the light of various physical, psychological and philosophical considerations, it seems that the particular structure allocated by Kant to space (i.e. uniqueness, infinity, (...) continuity, homogeneity, isotropy, Euclidean character and three-dimensional character) is neither necessary nor a priori but is rather contingent and dependent on experience. For this reason a pragmatist relativization of the transcendental approach appears to be necessary: the structure of space which makes knowledge possible is not apriori in an absolute sense, but rather, it is determined within the context of a certain practice, which is characterized by a certain mode of interaction with the environment and reveals particular empirical constraints to which this spatial structure must fit. (shrink)

In this talk I consider two problems for conceptual atomism. Conceptual atomism can be defended against the criticism that it seems to contend that all concepts are simply innate (even technical concepts to pre-technological humanoids) by specifying the innateness thesis as one of mechanisms of hooking up mental representations (concepts as language of thought types) to properties in the world (§1). This theory faces a problem with non-referring expressions/concepts, it seems. Conceptual atomism can, however, deal with non-referring expressions/concepts (§2). Hooking (...) up concepts with properties raises, further on, broader metaphysical problems of making concepts correspond to (natural) properties. These questions are much harder to answer (§3). (shrink)

Within the philosophy of logic there has been an old debate about strengths and weaknesses of so-called “deviant” logics, as compared to standard logic (i.e. First Order Logic with Identity). With the development of a multitude of many-valued and modal logical systems and the various ways they can be employed in various fields of philosophy, linguistics and computer science, former “deviant” logics have become well accepted. Nowadays we seem to have a new and almost contrary debate about whether there is (...) any universal logic at all or only a multitude of systems: logical pluralism. But what does logical pluralism claim? In this paper one prominent version of logical pluralism is the main target of further questions. (shrink)

Odio, violencia y emancipación son, sin duda, categorías hetero-géneas, que remiten a esferas nítidamente diferenciadas de la vida humana. Así, la primera —el odio— ha tendido tradicionalmente a ser recluida en la esfera de lo privado, esto es, a ser considerada como un sentimiento estrictamente individual. En consecuencia, se interpretaba que de su estudio debían ocuparse determinadas disciplinas (en especial la psicología, aunque no sólo ella), especializadas en el conocimiento de los diversos aspectos de la individualidad. Ahora bien, en los (...) últimos años se ha hecho evidente que la generalización del odio (junto con alguna otra categoría complemen-taria, como es el miedo) no puede seguir siendo analizada de forma tan restrictiva. Se odia y se teme demasiado (y a demasiadas cosas) como para seguir pensando que tales sentimientos son asunto de cada cual. Por tanto, el odio, como cualquier otro "sentimiento social", ha de ser puesto en conexión con esos otros vectores absolutamente básicos de la vida en común que son la violencia y la (expectativa de) emancipación. La insistencia en la conexión resulta particularmente importante para diferenciar, con la mayor nitidez posible, el plantea-miento seguido en estas páginas y el defendido por quienes consideran la violencia como una constante de carácter histórico-antropológico, presente desde siempre en la especie humana y que le lleva de modo inexorable a resolver sus conflictos por medios violentos. Se trata, en definitiva, de proponer una alternativa a la tesis conservadora que se resiste a aceptar que lo existente pueda dejar de ser como ha sido hasta ahora, esto es, a cualquier forma de emancipación. O de vida en común mínimamente buena. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze a way of valuing positively something which rarely has been taking into account in the literature: to value positively something because it could be valued positively by someone else. The main features of that way of valuing something are really very suggesting. Here, we would not have instrumental valuations, nor valuations directly sensitive to intrinsic values either. However, there would be cases in which valuations made in that way would make us able to detect things (...) that can be valued in an inconditional way. When we imagine or conceive what could be value positively, our motivational structures face us with something that is valued without evaluative conditions and, therefore, with something that is a good candidate to have an intrinsic value. (shrink)